We show how to construct laconic honest-verifier statistical zeroknowledge Diophantine arguments of knowledge (HVSZK AoK) that a committed tuple of integers belongs to Ë for all languages in bounded arithmetic. While doing this, we propose a new algorithm for computing the Lagrange representation of nonnegative integers and a new efficient representing polynomial for the exponential relation. As applications, we construct the most efficient known HVSZK AoK for nonnegativity, the first constant-round laconic HVSZK AoK for exponential relation, and propose communication-efficient versions of the Damgård-Jurik multi-candidate voting scheme and of the Lipmaa-Asokan-Niemí · ½µst-price auction scheme.
Introduction
It has been an open question since [AM76] , whether AEÈ, where is the set of Diophantine sets Ë that have representing polynomials Ê Ë with polynomially long witnesses. One is also trempted to ask a similar question È È about the "deterministic" version of class , the class È that contains such languages for which the corresponding witnesses can be found in polynomial time. The gap in our knowledge in such questions is quite surprising; this is maybe best demonstrated by the recent proof of Pollett that if co-NLOGTIME then AEÈ [Pol02] .
In this paper we take a more practice oriented approach. Namely, we are interested in the sets Ë with laconic (that is, with subquadratic-length) witnesses. We propose representing polynomials with laconic and polynomial-time computable witnesses for a practically important (although relatively small) class Ä ¾ of languages. As our first very
nontrivial contribution, we demonstrate that the exponential relation has a representing polynomial with polynomial-time computable subquadratic-length witnesses. This improves significantly on the previous best result of [AM76] . Our next contribution is a new algorithm for finding, given a positive integer , such integers´ ½ µ that ¾ ½ · ¡ ¡ ¡ · ¾ . This algorithm improves on the Rabin-Shallit algorithm [RS86] . Combining these two number-theoretic results, we can prove that a practically relevant class Ä ¾ of languages (namely, the languages belonging to the bounded arithmetic) have representing polynomials with (in all practical purposes) subquadratically long witnesses. Importantly, all such witnesses can be computed in polynomial time. This class of languages includes many arithmetic and number-theoretic relations like ¿ Ñ Ü´ ½ ¾ µ℄, but also relations like ¾ is the th bit of ½ ℄.
While representing polynomials with short witnesses have independent interest in complexity theory [AM76] , our work on this topic was motivated by cryptographic applications. Given an integer commitment scheme [FO99, DF02] with efficient arguments of knowledge for additive and multiplicative relations, one can argue (by using the methodology from [FO99] ) in honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge (HVSZK) that ´ µ ¼, where is a tuple of committed integers. However, there has been no previous formal treatment of what happens if one extends this methodology (at least not when coupled with an integer commitment scheme) so as to enable the demonstration of knowledge of an auxiliary witness , for which ´ µ ¼. A natural requirement here is that if the arguer convinces the verifier in that, the verifier will also be convinced that ¾ Ë where Ê Ë is the representing polynomial of Ë.
Therefore, by using well-known cryptographic tools, one can construct polynomiallength three-round HVSZK arguments of knowledge that ¾ Ë for any Ë ¾ . However, these arguments can only be executed if the arguer knows the corresponding witness. If there is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the witness from (that is, Ë ¾ È ), then one will be able to argue that ¾ Ë for an arbitrary ¾ Ë. If, additionally, the corresponding witnesses are subquadratic (as they are when Ë ¾ Ä ¾ ) then by using our methodology one can often improve upon previously known arguments of knowledge-either in efficiency, or by basing the arguments on weaker security requirements: namely, it is sufficient to require that the underlying integer commitment scheme is statistically hiding and computationally binding [FO99] . In particular, we use our new algorithm for finding the representation ¾ ½ · ¡ ¡ ¡ · ¾ to propose a new argument of knowledge for nonnegativity of the committed integer. This argument is conceptually much simpler than Boudot's protocol for the same problem [Bou00] , somewhat shorter, and offers perfect completeness.
After that, we propose a general model for cryptographic protocols that involve social or financial choices (e.g., voting or auctions). In this model one can implement any function from class È (e.g., maximum-finding in the case of auctions) by using subquadratic-length interaction. As [CGS97, DJ01, LAN02] , our model uses a certain encoding function Ò together with a homomorphic public-key cryptosystem.
Finally, we propose a few alternative constructions for the encoding function. Until now, one has mostly used the function Ò´Òµ Ò , where is an a priori fixed upper limit on the number of participants [DJ01, LAN02] . We show that one can instead used the function Ò´Òµ ´Òµ, where ´Òµ is the Òth member of a certain Lucas sequence, to achieve otherwise exactly the same properties as in [DJ01, LAN02] but with linear-length (instead of quadratic-length) correctness arguments. We also propose an efficient algorithm for computing ´Òµ. We are not aware of any previous use of Lucas sequence for the purpose of zero-knowledge proofs or arguments, so also this result might be of wider interest. We also demonstrate another approach that uses exponentiation as the encoding function. Road-map. We introduce necessary preliminaries in Section 2. In Section 3, we prove that languages in Ä ¾ have representing polynomials with subquadratic-length witnesses.
We present a methodology that allows to apply our HVSZK arguments-of-knowledge together with homomorphic cryptosystems to a variety of cryptographic protocols in Section 4. Finally, the appendix describes our simplifications and extensions to the Damgård-Fujisaki commitment scheme together with a new and efficient argument system for the multiplicative relation.
Preliminaries and Notation
We say that an algorithm is efficient if works in probabilistic polynomial time with respect to the length of its longest parameter; we denote the set of efficient algorithms by . Let Ø´Ü µ denote the th bit of Ü, i.e., Ü For our purposes we adapt a slightly modified definition of bounded arithmetic where the underlying domain is instead of ÁAE. We denote by Ä ¾ the set of terms of the quantor-free bounded arithmetic (over ).
One can express a large number of relations in Ä ¾ . For example, ½ ¾ ℄´µ Ã´É´ µµ a three-round honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge (HVSZK) twoparty argument of knowledge that given a value (known to both parties), the arguer knows an integer parameter , such that the predicate É´ µ is true. We always denote the values, knowledge of which has to be proved, by Greek letters; the scope of such variables lies within a single argument of knowledge. The symbol will always denote an auxiliary witness. As an example, Ã´Ý Ã´ µ ¾ µ denotes a HVSZK argument of knowledge that given a ciphertext Ý and a public key Ã, the arguer knows a plaintext and a randomness such that Ý Ã´ µ and is a perfect square. Our protocols will be arguments of knowledge in the model of Damgård and Fujisaki [DF02] . An important property of the zero-knowledge arguments is that the verifier cannot extract additional information even if he is given infinite time. This makes arguments of knowledge more attractive than proofs of knowledge in applications where privacy is paramount. HVSZK arguments can be transfered to SZK arguments by using a number of well-known methods. The underlying root assumption is modified to have the following, simpler, form: given random Ý, it is hard to produce such´Ü µ that Ý Ü and is reasonably small.
By using an arbitrary secure integer commitment scheme, one can build an HVSZK argument systems for different relations between committed integers . In all such argument systems, arguer and verifier have to fix an a priori upper bound Å to input , for every . The argument system is guaranteed to have the statistical zero-knowledge property only if Å . Therefore, in such protocols the interaction length depends on ÐÓ ¾ Å , and thus it is beneficial to precompute as precise values of Å as feasible. Certainly it must be the case that ÐÓ ¾ Å Ç´½µ . Additionally, we describe in Appendix A how to commit to an integer tuple (and not just to an integer). The resulting so called RDF integer tuple commitment scheme can be used to construct more efficient arguments of knowledge than the Damgård-Fujisaki commitment scheme by itself. Thm. 2 from below. For convenience, we will implicitly assume that the variables belong to (and not to ÁAE ¼ ).
Bounded Arithmetic is in È
We will introduce a new complexity class È that is a Diophantine analogue of È. Namely, we say that Ë ¾ È iff there is a polynomial Ê Ë ¾ ℄, such that (1) 
represented by the polynomial Ê Ë´ ½ ¾ µ ¾ ½ ½.) The representing polynomial for can be constructed by using the representing polynomial for nonnegativity, see Thm. 
Ù Ø
Exponential Relation is in È . Matiyasevich was the first to describe an explicit representing polynomial for the exponential relation. Alternative polynomial were later found in [Dav73, JSWW76] , but none of these polynomials is really practical for our purposes. As an example, a polynomial proposed in [MR75] 
The cases ½ ¼, ¿ ¼ and ¾ ¾ ¼ ½ ¾℄ can be handled trivially, and therefore the exponential relation belongs to È for any ½ ¾ ¿ . One application of this theorem is that an arbitrary Turing machine can be emulated by a more efficient Diophantine Turing machine than it was known before [AM76] . ´ ½ µ is the witness). After that, she argues in HVSZK that she knows such a representation. The full argument system is described in Appendix B. A noninteractive version of such argument system is ½ ¼¼ bytes long for realistic security parameters. This is slightly shorter than Boudot's argument system [Bou00] for the same problem. Additionally, our argument system is perfectly complete, while Boudot's argument system is not. A nice demonstration of the usefulness of our representation-based integer commitment scheme is the fact that this argument system has only ½ times larger noninteractive argument than the original multiplication proof of Damgård and Fujisaki. This is achieved by doing four squarings in parallel. Outsourcing Model. A general setting in many cryptographic protocols (like voting and auctions [LAN02] ) involves a set of participants, an authority and possibly an impartial third party. Assume that all the following steps are authenticated. The participants make social or financial choices Ú , encode them as Ò´Ú µ , and then encrypt the resulting encodings by using a homomorphic public-key cryptosystem and third party's public key, and send the results (together with a HVSZK argument of correctness) to the authority. The authority multiplies the ciphertexts and sends the product É Ã´ Ò ´Ú µµ Ã´È Ò´Ú µµ to the third party. The third party decrypts the result, obtains the sum È Ò´Ú µ and applies a decoding function to obtain the vector ´ µ, where can for example be the number of voters whose choice was . The third party applies some function to , and sends ´ µ to the authority together with an argument of correctness that ´ µ was correctly computed. The authority then broadcasts ´ µ and the argument of correctness to all participants.
Cryptographic Applications
As an example, could be an identity function. Then this model will implement a common voting process with an accountable third party. If ´ µ ¼ where ¼ Ñ Ü , one could implement voting with minimal information disclosure.
Namely, the authority would only get to know the name of the winner. There are no such efficient prior art voting schemes. One can also implement the´ ·½µst-price auctions by choosing ´ µ ¼ , where ¼ is the´ · ½µst largest social choice [LAN02] .
(This includes Vickrey auctions, for example.) In general, this "outsourcing" model enables one to construct secure and extremely efficient voting (or auction) schemes with the only drawback that the third party (but only she) will get to know the value of . In particular, this enables one to avoid threshold trust. (See [LAN02] for arguments why the information leakage to the authority does not matter but the property of not using threshold trust does.) Now, can be any function for which the predicate Ý ´Üµ℄ belongs to È . As we have shown, 
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A Damgård-Fujisaki integer commitment scheme
Let Ò ¾ be a group generation algorithm that on the input ½ outputs the description ×Ö´ µ of a finite Abelian group . Apart from the usual assumptions (given ¾ ¦ £ , it is easy to verify that ¾ Ò´½ µ, easy to verify whether some belongs to for which ×Ö´ µ, and easy to perform group operations in for which ×Ö´ µ), we require a few additional assumptions. Í has only prime factors at most ´ µ (we call such numbers ´ µ-smooth) and the order of À has prime factors larger than ´ µ (we call such numbers ´ µ-rough).
Let ´ µ Í . Then ´ µ is ´ µ-smooth. It is assumed that (1) ´ µ ´ µ and that ×Ö´ µ includes ´ µ; (2) for any string it can be decided on polynomial time, based on´Ü ×Ö´ µµ, whether Ü represents an element in . Finally, it is assumed that the next strong divisible root assumption holds: given a random Ê Ò´½ µ and Ý Ê , it is hard to produce such´Ü µ that Ý Ü and ´ µ. The probability is taken over the coin tosses of Ò and of the adversary. Note that this assumption is an equivalent but simpler version of the root assumption from [DF02] .
It was shown in [DF02] that can be chosen as Ò for RSA modulus Ò ÔÕ, such that ´Ô ½ Õ ½µ ¾, Ô ½ and Õ ½ do not have too many small factors, and the strong RSA assumption holds. However, when the RSA group £ Ò is used, one must additionally assume that the arguer does not know the value ³´Òµ. This may achieved, for example, when the verifier creates Ò and keeps its factorization secret.
Commitment scheme. During the setup phase of Damgård-Fujisaki integer commitment scheme, and Î agree on the group and on a large integer ´ µ. Verifier Î chooses a random element ¾ (which by the group assumptions has a ´ µ-rough order [DF02] with an overwhelming probability. To make the order certainly ´ µ-rough, one might raise a random element to the power ´ µ.) and a random secret key It is straightforward to show that the security of the Damgård-Fujisaki integer commitment scheme and the security of the the sketched extension (that we call the RDF integer commitment scheme) are equivalent, given that the arguer does not know the mutual discrete logarithms of elements . As a simple corollary, we can use the RDF integer commitment scheme to build HVSZK arguments of knowledge of type Ã´¡ ¡ ¡ Ý Ã´ ½ Ò µ µ.
The RDF integer commitment scheme can be used to speed up the efficiency of many argument systems, by enabling one to prove several multiplicative or additive relations at once [Bra97] . (In contrast, without using the RDF scheme, a separate protocol must be used for every polynomial relation.) That is, such combined arguments enable one to argue in parallel that Î Ý Ô´ ½ Ò µ for polynomially many instances of any polynomial Ô.
As an example, one can construct an argument for the multiplicative relation
